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Bounded Cumulative Prospect Theory: Some Implications for   
Gambling Outcomes 
 
Michael Cain1, David Law1,* and David A. Peel2
Abstract 
 
Standard parametric specifications of Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) can  
explain why agents bet on longshots at actuarially unfair odds. However the 
standard specification of CPT cannot explain why people might bet on more 
favored outcomes, where by construction the greatest volume of money is bet. 
This paper outlines a parametric specification than can consistently explain 
gambling over all outcomes. In particular we assume that the value function is 
bounded from above and below and that the degree of loss aversion experienced 
by the agent is smaller for small-stake gambles (as a proportion of wealth) than 
usually assumed in CPT. Th re are a number of new implications of this 
specification. Boundedness of the value function in CPT implies that the 
indifference curve between expected-return and win-probability for a given stake  
will typically exhibit both an asymptote (implying rejection of an infinite gain bet) 
and a minimum, as the shape of the value function dominates the probability 
weighting function. Also the high probability section of the indifference curve will 
exhibit a maximum.  
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Bounded Cumulative Prospect Theory: Some Implications for   
Gambling Outcomesi
1. Introduction 
Original  Prospect theory (OPT), proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
and Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) as proposed by  Starmer and Sugden 
(1989) and  Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is able  to resolve the Allais paradox 
[see e.g. Allais and Hagen (1979)] and also explains a variety of experimental 
evidence which is inconsistent with standard expected-utility theory [see e.g. 
Starmer (2000), Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), and Thaler (1985)]. ii 
It is also claimed that CPT can explain outcomes in gambling markets For 
instance. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), note that CPT predicts insurance and 
gambling for small probabilities but state that “the present analysis falls far short 
of a fully adequate account of these complex phenomena”. This appears to be 
the case. With the standard parametric specifications, gambling on longshots at 
actuarially unfair odds can optimally occur, but betting on 50/50 and odds-on 
chances cannot. Given that most of the money bet is on favourites many would 
argue CPT as currently constructed has not provided an explanation of outcomes 
observed in gambling markets [see Sauer (1998) and Vaughan Williams (1999) 
for comprehensive surveys]. Given that the great majority of people in developed 
countries participate in gambling, at least occasionally, iii and that gambles often 
involve large stakes,iv a model specification that can explain the outcomes in 
actual gambling markets seems perhaps more important than one that can 
explain the risk attitudes of small samples of studentsv who, as we show below. 
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would  for some  typical parameter estimates reported not  gamble at actuarially 
unfair odds. 
Given this background, the purpose in this paper is to consider the implications of 
a different parametric specification of CPT for gambling over mixed prospects. 
This is because the standard parametric specification of CPT based on power 
value functions is not appropriate for explaining gambling outcomes. In particular 
power utility violates the assumption of loss aversion for low enough stakes, (also 
pointed out by Köbberling and Wakker (2005), Schmidt and Zank (2005) and Law 
and Peel (2005)). Consequently   any optimal model of gambling based on power 
value functions (e.g. Bradley (2003)) will imply violation of the assumption of loss 
aversion. There are also a number of other reasons outlined below to suggest 
that the power function is also not consistent with other empirical evidence. As a 
consequence we specify a bounded value function. (Also suggested by 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) and Giorgi and Thorsten Hens (2005) in different 
contexts). This specification has a number of interesting and new implications in 
the gambling context.  In particular, (a) if stakes are not too large the assumption 
of ultimate bounded ness of the value function will imply a minimum in the 
indifference curve in expected return-win probability space, for a given sise stake 
(b) the indifference curve will exhibit an asymptote, typically at very small 
probabilities, indicating that the agent would turn down a bet involving the 
possibility of an infinite gain; (c) though depending on the degree of risk aversion  
assumed over gains, the asymptote can occur at any probability in the 0 -1 
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range; (d), in the absence of probability distortion agents will, paradoxically, 
ultimately accept very large  bets on odds-on chances at actuarially unfair odds ;  
(e) If the agent is sufficiently  risk-averse over gains and  risk-seeking over losses 
they can  bet on odds on favourites although everywhere loss averse. 
(f) Our  parameterizations can simultaneously account for gambling on unlikely 
gains and the Allais paradox behavior. This is not the case with the standard 
parametric specification.(see Neison and Stowe (2002)). 
 Our parametric specification of the assumption of boundedness of the utility 
function allows us to choose the degree of loss aversion exhibited by agents over 
small and large stake symmetric gambles.  Varying the different parameters, 
namely the degree of risk-aversion over gains and risk-seeking over losses, the 
degree of loss aversion or the probability weighting function over gains and  
losses, allows us to explain both gambling on favoured outcomes and longshots 
and hence contribute  towards an explanation of the stylized empirical outcome 
of the  favourite-longshot bias observed in most  gambling markets. (see e.g. see 
Sauer (1998) and Vaughan Williams (1999), Cain, Law and Peel (2003)) 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section two we consider the 
implications of the CPT model for the shape of the indifference curve between 
expected-return and win-probability for mixed prospects.   Section three develops 
further implications by assuming a particular parametric form of the Kahneman-
Tversky function, and Section four contains a brief conclusion. 
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2.  The Indifference Curve between Expected-return and Win-probability    
Defining reference point utility as zero, for a gamble to occur in CPT we require 
expected utility or value to be non-negative:vi 
-( ) ( )  w (1- ) ( )  0  r lEU w p U so p U s+=    (1) 
where the win-probability is given by p, and the functions w p+( ) and w p ( )1 are  
non-linear s-shaped probability weighting functions.   U sor ( )  is the value derived 
from a winning gamble, where o are the odds and s the stake.  U sl ( )  is the 
disutility derived from a losing gamble.  
From (1) the optimal stake is such that 

=
EU
s
0 so that 
 ' '( ) ( )( ) ( )  (1 ) ( )  r lw p s pp U w p U s
p p
µµ
+
 =  (2) 
where the expected return from a unit gamble,µ , is defined as 
 µ = +p o( )1 (3) 
A bet is defined to be actuarially fair whenµ = 1 .
From (2) we have that   s s p= ( , )µ if 0EU  . Substituting s s p= ( , )µ into (1) 
gives expected value, EU , as a function of µ and p , and hence an indifference 
map in ( , )µ p space may be obtained by differentiating (1) with respect to p and 
equating to zero, in order to find the combinations of expected return,µ , and 
probability, p , between which the bettor is indifferent.   
 This produces :
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dEU
dp
w p
p
U so w p
p
U s w p s
p
U so s w p
p
U so d
dp
w p
p
p U s p
p
w p U s ds
dp
r l r r
r l
=



 

 +
+ 

  =
+  +

+

+
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { ( ) ( )}
[ ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )]
1
1 0
2
µ µ
µ µ
(4) 
and hence, in view of (2), (4) reduces to                                                           
(1 ) ( ){1 }         
( ) ( )
l
r
gp lp
u u
d o w p U s oo
dp w p U so
µ  
 

+

= +  + (5) 
where   u gp lpsoU so
U so
w p
p
p
w p
w p
p
p
w p
r
r= =


=
 
 
+
+


' ( )
( )
, ( )
( )
, ( )
( )
 1
1
where  u is the elasticity ofU (.) ,  gp  is the elasticity of the probability weighting 
function over gains (strictly positive), and  lp is its elasticity over losses (strictly 
negative).  
 Equation (5) also holds for any arbitrary fixed level of stake.  We can simplify (5), 
for the purposes of exposition by noting from (1) that in order to gamble we 
require     1 1 

+
w p U s
w p U so
l
r
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
 .    So that for the expected –probability frontier, 
( , )µ p ,where the agent is just indifferent between gambling and not gambling (5) 
simplifies to 
 
d
dp
o o
gp lp
u
µ  

= + 
( [ ])1 (6)
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The expected return –probability frontier has to exhibit a positive slope in order to 
be able to explain gambling at unfair odds or to explain the favourite-longshot 
bias, since d
dp
µ is observed to be positive over much of its range in real markets.  
We recall that in the early literature the explanation of the favourite-longshot bias 
assumed that agent’s utility functions were convex. and so exhibited risk-loving 
behaviour. (see e.g. Ali (1987) ). In the CPT model agents will act as if risk-
loving, so that d
dp
µ >0, when the probability distortion is strong enough to 
dominate  factors which militate against gambling, namely the concavity of 
the value function, loss aversion, and the fact that gambles are typically  
actuarially unfair at low probabilities.  
From inspection of (5) (and (7)) we observe the precise form that this has to take. 
For the agent to appear as if risk-loving it is necessary that the sum of the 
elasticity’s of the probability weighting functions are less than the elasticity of   
the value function over gains. In many of the experimental studies, based on 
student responses, the estimates of parameters of  the  elasticity’s of  power 
utility and weighting function violate this condition for gambling. (see e.g. 
(Camerer and Ho (1994)  u =0.225,  gp =0.56 (for small probabilities), Wu and 
Gonzalez (1996)  u =0.5,  gp =0.71, (for small probabilities).  
 The size of stake will also influence the slope of the indifference curve by, in 
general, changing the elasticity of the value function over gains, so that a lower 
(higher) stake size increases (decreases) the elasticity. It will also change the 
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8
propensity to gamble, (from 5) as changing stake size changes the ratio of the 
utility loss to the utility gain from the gamble at given odds. 
 
One interesting feature of the CPT model, as shown below in a parametric 
example, is that the slope of the indifference curve, d
dp
µ , can be negative at 
actuarially unfair odds, µ <1. This is not possible in the standard expected-utility 
model, where d
dp
µ <1 and µ >1 everywhere. 
 
2. A Parametric Example of the Kahneman - Tversky Model 
K and T assumed a power value function in their empirical work. However this 
functional form has a variety of limitations that make it unsuitable for analysis of 
gambling in general. The limitations of the power function are both empirical and 
theoretical and are as follows. 
1. K and T (1992) assume that the utility or value function exhibits loss 
aversion so that the slope changes abruptly at the reference point.  In 
particular, the function is postulated to fall roughly twice as fast over losses 
as it rises over gains, exhibiting diminishing sensitivity as the marginal 
impact of losses or gains diminishes with distance from the reference point 
In the case of a power value function, the assumption of loss aversion is 
violated for small-stake gambling, and the agent becomes infinitely gain 
loving as the stake approaches zero.  Let the value function  be  
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0 (0< 1
( )                                       (7)   
( )   0    ( 0, 0< <1)
x x
v x
x x



  
  <= 
  < >
Now    > is a necessary assumption in order to ensure that stake size is 
determinate  
Loss aversion, defined for a symmetrical gamble as the ratio of the gain to the 
loss is given for the power utility as  
We observe from (8) that as stake size approaches zero the ratio becomes 
infinitely large so that the agent violates the assumption of loss aversion ( 
See also e.g. Köbberling and Wakker (2004) and Law and Peel (2007))). 
2. Some important experimental evidence is inconsistent with a power value 
function. Markowitz (1952), Biswanger (1980), Hershey and Shoemaker (1980) 
and Holt and Laury (2002) report evidence that increases in payoff levels 
increase risk aversion. In these experiments the probabilities, in a sequence of 
gambles, are kept fixed as agents choose between a gamble and its certainty 
equivalent (kept fixed) or between a “safer” and “more risky” gamble.  Choices 
change significantly with size of payoff. With a power value function this would 
not occur.  This result is particularly important in the case of Holt and Laury who 
use real payoffs as well as hypothetical payoffs. They find that risk aversion 
increases sharply as payoffs are scaled up.  
3. Blavatsky (2005) shows that the Kahneman-Tversky parameterization cannot 
resolve the St. Petersburg paradox unless the power coefficient of the utility 
x
x

 ( )
 (8)
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function is less than that of the probability weighting function.  However, this 
implies that the agent cannot exhibit risk-loving behaviour, as shown above.  
3. Neilson and Stowe (2002) show that parameters required of the power 
specification and weighting function  cannot simultaneously resolve the Allais 
paradox and account for gambling at actuarially unfair odds. 
.
Given these objections In order to generate further predictions from the analytical 
framework set out above, we specify a parametric form for the Kahneman -
Tversky model. Rather than the power form used by Kahneman and Tversky, this 
paper employs  the expo-power function ( see Saha (1993)) with the advantage 
that it nests both the exponential and the power function.. 
 
where r, and    are positive constants. 
For n  1 the agent is everywhere risk-averse over gains  and risk-seeking over 
losses as postulated by KT.  Also as   0 we obtain the power specification 
of K and T. 
 The value function in (9) has upper and lower bounds as is commonly assumed, 
e.g. Markowitz (1952) and Machina (1982).  This is a sufficient condition for the 
resolution of the St. Petersburg Paradox [see, e.g. Menger (1967) and Bassett 
(1997)]. 
EU w p e w p er s o s
n n n
=    +   ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1  (9)
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For the expo-power value function in (9), the degree of loss aversion, (LA), is 
defined by the ratio of the utility gain to the utility loss from a symmetric gamble, 
given by  
LA e
e
r s
s
n
n=




( )
( )
1
1


(10)                                                                             
Unlike the power value function the degree of loss aversion varies as stake size 
changes.   As stake size approaches zero, the assumption of loss aversion 
requires that r

<1, and as it becomes large that 1 1

< . In order to ensure 
that 


LA
s
0 , so that the degree of loss aversion does not decrease with an 
increase in stake size, which would be counter intuitive, we require in general  
that 
d U s
U s
ds
r
l
( )
( ) < 0 , which for LA<1, implies that 

<


U s
s
U s
s
r l( ) ( )  for all s, which is 
consistent with the definition of loss aversion of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005)). For the exponential function this implies the 
additional requirement that  r  1.
Differentiation of (9) with respect to stake size gives us the optimal stake size, s, as 
s
w p ro
w p
ro
n
n
n
= 

L
N
MMMM
O
Q
PPPP
+
ln
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1


(11) 
with the second order condition    
ron  >1 0 (12)                                                                                                            
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From the numerator of (11) a necessary condition for optimal stake size to be 
positive is that  
 w p ro
w p
n+
 
>
( )
( )1
1

(13) 
 
This condition is precisely that required to undertake gambles with the power value 
formulation of KT, but in that model optimal stake size is indeterminate.  
Peel and Law (2007) pointed out that (13) can hold for odds on favourites when the 
gamble is actuarially unfair if n is small enough. As n becomes smaller the agent 
becomes more risk-averse over gains and more risk-loving over losses.  
We also note that  there are important implications of varying stake size. As stake 
size  approaches zero, employing L’Hopitals rule, the agent will gamble if  
o w p
w p r
n +
 

( )
( )1
 (14)
 
This condition will be met for standard specifications of the weighting function as 
odds become large. Consequently the model implies  agents will gamble at small 
enough stakes without violating the assumption of loss aversion. 
In Figures 1(a) and 1(b) we plot  the probability weighting function employed and 
its elasticity,  ( gp ) over gains for the parameter values of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992)], to illustrate their numeric values over the probability range, (employing 
alternative functional forms such as  that of  Prelec (1998)or  Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) made no qualitative difference to our analysis). 
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The ratio of the weighting functions, w p
w p
+
 
( )
( )1
, is a key determinant of whether   
to gamble from (1) and their impact, relative to the zero probability distortion-free 
case, is given by ( ) .
(1 ) 1
w p p
w p p
+
  
This is plotted in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).   
We observe that the elasticity of the probability weighting function becomes 
infinitely large as p approaches 1, and is less than one when p=0.  
We observe from Figure 2(a) that the probability weighting function enhances the 
attraction of longshot gambles per se, but diminishes the attraction of more 
favoured outcomes, with the cross-over occurring at probabilities of around 0.45.  
When probability distortion over gains exceeds that over losses, the cross-over 
can occur at much higher probabilities, illustrated in Figure 2(b).vii 
For the exponential value function the slope of the indifference curve is given by 
d
dp
o e e o
r ns
e
r ns
e e w p
w p
gp
r s o n
n
lp
n
s ro s
n n
n n nµ
 


 = + 

+ 
 

+{
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
}( )1 1 1 1
1
1 (15)  
Note from (15) that as o , then d
dp
µ will ultimately become negative (due to 
the third and fourth terms increasing at a greater rate than the second-recall elp  
is negative). In this case the bounded ness of the value function ultimately 
dominates the probability weighting function, so that there is a range of behaviour 
not obtainable in previous analysis (see e.g. Prelec’s (2000, p.90)).  
Also, note that increasing stake size will ultimately lead to d
dp
µ
< 0 , (due to the 
third and fourth  term) and this may occur over the whole of the probability range 
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so that the agent will again appear to behave as a expected utility maximizer, so 
long as µ >1 which will be the case for large enough stakes.  
As stake size becomes small the elasticity of the value function approaches n so 
that  d
dp
µ
> 0 from (15)  assuming any feasible elasticities of the weighting 
function. 
 There are two further implications of the property of the expo-power function that 
it is bounded  from above and below. 
Let  the upper bound limit be unity (so U sor n( )  1 as son ).    The agent 
would then turn down an infinite gain gamble if 
w p
w p
U sl n
+
 
<
( )
( )
( )
1
(16) 
Consequently, there is a win-probability threshold beyond which infinite gain bets 
will be turned down. The precise threshold will depend on particular parameter 
values, as illustrated below, but can occur even with small stakes. This is one 
implication of boundedness. A second one is that if bet size becomes very large, 
so that U sor n( ) ) 1 and U(sn  so that the agent will gamble if 
w p
w p
+
 
>
+
( )
( )1 1


(17) 
 
As a consequence, the agent could gamble at actuarially unfair odds at some 
large enough stake.  Clearly such gambles are less likely to be observed if the 
degree of loss aversion for large stake gambles is itself large. 
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Some of the above possibilities are illustrated in Figures 3(a) – 4 with n=1 for 
convenience .   In Figure 3(a) expected utility is plotted against win-probability 
when the stake is set at its optimal value so 

=
EU
s
0 , the degree of loss aversion 
is as postulated by Kahneman and Tversky, and the probability weighting 
function has the parameter estimates suggested in some of the experimental 
literature. The agent is observed gambling on a longshot where the expected loss 
per unit staked is 0.45, so µ = 0 55. . The distortion to probabilities caused by the 
probability weighting function overcomes the disinclination to gamble caused by 
the degree of loss aversion, so that the agent bets on longshots.  
In Figures 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) we plot the indifference curves between expected 
return and win-probability for a small constant s . viii Figure 3(b) illustrates that 
d
dp
µ can be negative, when expected returns are less than unity, a feature that 
cannot occur in an expected-utility model, and that the indifference curve has a 
maximum in the favourite end of the spectrum at better than actuarially fair odds.  
From Figures 3(c) and 3(d) we observe that the indifference curve exhibits both a 
minimum, and an asymptote, so that the agent turns down a gamble with infinite 
expected return, at an extremely small probability.  In this case, the boundedness 
of the value function ultimately “overpowers” the probability weighting function, 
contrary to previous models in the literature.    
In Figure 4 we plot the indifference curve between expected return and win-
probability for a large s . The key features are that the asymptote now occurs at 
a higher win-probability, and the indifference curve is negatively sloped 
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throughout its range. The interaction of high stakes and the curvature of the value 
function dominate the influence of the probability weighting function so that the 
agent has an indifference curve which is observationally equivalent to an 
expected utility maximiser. 
 By choice of s and other parameter values we can position the asymptote at 
any win-probability. For example, using the exponential value function, with 
parameters 45,  90,  0.0001r  = = = , and the probability weighting functions of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992), with parameters of 0.61 for gains and 0.69 for 
losses, we calculate that in order to bet $10, with win-probability of 0.5, the agent 
would need to win at least $18.13 (plausibly less than that of the students in the 
Kahneman-Tversky experiments).   In addition, this agent would accept a bet to 
win infinity or lose $100 at win probability of 0.5 ( EU = 0 093. ), unlike the 
expected-utility maximizer, who would (absurdly) reject this gamble, as 
demonstrated by Rabin (2000). Indeed, our agent would accept this $100 gamble 
if the potential gain were more than $336.1. However, this Kahneman-Tversky 
agent would reject a bet to win infinity or lose $10 at a win-probability of 0.02 or 
less.  Consequently seemingly reasonably well calibrated CPT models can also 
exhibit seemingly absurd behaviour similar to that of the expected-utility 
maximiser.  
Kahneman-Tversky agents with less loss aversion 
 
The degree of loss aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky, based on 
student responses, arguably seems to  large to be widely applicable to other 
agents.ix 
Page 16 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
 Leroy (2003) makes the point in the context of more traditional asset markets. 
He questions who would actually turn down a bet to win $11 or lose $10 at a win- 
probability of 0.5 (as the Kahneman-Tversky students do), noting that such 
gambles have riskQreturn characteristics  superior to those of the daily returns on 
common stocks, which individuals generally find acceptable. 
 With this point in mind, we relax the degree of loss aversion over small stakes.x
In addition we allow the probability distortion over losses to be slightly greater 
than over gains, as suggested by the empirical work of Jullien and Salanie 
(2000).  
 In Figures 5(a) we plot over the win-probability range typically observed in horse-
racing (0.01 - 0.7), the indifference curve between expected return and win 
probability for the agent making a 10 unit stake. It has the shape of the typical 
favourite–longshot bias reported for the US and UK horse –racing markets. In 
addition, the probability weighting function   induces a maximum in the 
indifference curve for extreme favourites, requiring rates of return greater than 
unity.  
The parameter values chosen for this agent are such that she will exhibit the 
typical pattern of preferences outlined by Allais (1953) for gambles involving 
millions as well as those found by Kahneman and Tversky who employed 
moderate (thousands) rather than large scale gainsxi. Whilst exhibiting the “Allais 
Paradox” the agent will nevertheless will gamble at even odds at roulette and 
horse racing or bet on the NFL. 
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 In Figure 5(b) we illustrate the expected return-win probability indifference curve 
that might depict a typical student. Whilst she too will exhibit the preferences 
found by Allais and Kahneman and Tversky in experiments she will not gamble 
on favourites. She exhibits the degree of loss aversion suggested by K and T 
over small stakes and requires exactly to win 30 to gamble 10 on a 50-50 
chance. Nevertheless she will buy lottery tickets.   
Finally in Figure 6 we illustrate the agent betting on an odds on favourite when 
the agent becomes very risk-averse over gains and very risk-seeking over losses 
although everywhere loss averse. We illustrate this point assuming no probability 
distortion. The parameters are r n= = =25 50 0 25, , . . . We suppose for illustrative 
purposes that µ =0.94737, the expected return to a one-unit gamble at roulette. 
In figure 6 we plot the relationship between expected utility and the objective win 
probability when stake size is optimal and given by (11). 
 
.
4. Conclusion 
Whilst the standard parametric specification of CPT by KT can provide an 
explanation of gambling on longshots (low probability bets) at actuarially unfair 
odds, gambling on more favoured outcomes is inexplicable. Given that in actual 
economies a sizeable proportion of agents gamble and most of the money bet is 
on favourites this is a major limitation of the model.  Whilst K and T assumed 
power value functions in their experimental work this is unsuitable for the 
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simultaneous analysis of gambling outcomes and the Allais paradox as noted by 
Neilson and Stowe (2002), who stated that the most obvious conclusion of our 
work is that alternative functional forms are needed. In this paper we assume an 
exp-power value function and show that gambling over all outcomes at actuarially 
unfair odds can be explained. In addition we can simultaneously explain the 
Allais paradox with the chosen parameter values, as shown in our calibrated 
examples in the last section. 
We show that boundedness of the value function in CPT theory implies that the 
indifference curve between expected-return and win-probability will exhibit a 
minimum at low win-probabilities, because the shape of the value function 
dominates the probability weighting function.  Also, a maximum will occur at high 
win-probabilities.  
The analysis in the paper shows how KT agents with different degrees of loss 
aversion, probability distortion or risk-aversion or risk–loving over gains and 
losses can optimally bet  at actuarially unfair odds on probabilities spanning the 
whole probability range. Naturally an aggregate model of gambling outcomes  
based on KT agents would have to embody heterogeneous agents rather than a 
representative frame work as in Ali(1977). However such a model is consistent 
with a major feature  of experimental work. For example Harrison et al. (2007) who 
suggest that one should not readily assume homogenous risk preferences for the 
population. In fact aggregate models based on heterogeneous agents would seem 
necessary to simultaneously explain the favourite long shot bias or reverse 
favourite long shot bias observed in different counties or between different 
gambling activities. Peel and Law (2007a) is one such attempt. 
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Figures 1 (a) -1(b) 
 
Shape and Impact of the Probability Weighting Function (PWF) 
(a)  Probability Weighting Function                                            (b) Elasticity of the PWF over Gains 
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Figures 2(a) -2(b)  
 Impact of the Probability Weighting Function on Gambling  
 
(a) Impact of the PWF on the gambling  decision           (b) Impact of the PWF on the gambling decision 
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Figures 3(a) -3(d) 
 Expected Utility, Expected Return and Probability for CPT 
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Figure 4 
 Asymptote  in  Expected Return and Probability  
 
(a)  ( , )µ p p indifference curve in range 0 1 
EU w p e w p e
s r
w p w p
r so s=     =
= = =

+   
+ 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
, . , ,
( ), ( )
1 1 1 0
1 0 000001 45
1
 
  = 90.
 as in 3(a).
µ
p 0.90.80.70.60.50.40.3
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Page 29 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
30
 
Figures 5 (a) and (b)  
 Indifference curves  for  a   Less Loss Averse Gambler and  a “student”   
 
(a) ( , )µ p p: 0.0001  1 (b)  ( , )µ p p: 0.0001  1
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Endnotes 
i We are grateful to Robert Sugden for comments on an earlier version.
ii For instance the apparent prefer nce of some agents for segregated gains reported by 
Thaler (1985, p. 203) whose survey vidence indicated that most people believe that a 
person would be happier to win $50 plus $25 in separate lotteries rather than $75 in a 
single lottery. An excellent discussion of this experimental evidence can be found in 
Starmer (2000).  Rabin (2000) provides further indirect support for CPT, in 
demonstrating that the assumption of global risk-aversion has implications for agents’ 
preferences with respect to small and large gambles that appear untenable a priori.  In 
particular, he shows that if an agent turns down a gambl  to win $11 or lose $10, each 
with probability 0.5, at all prevailing wealth levels, then she ill also turn down a bet to 
win infinity or lose $100, each with probability 0.5.   In addition, Rabin notes that the 
assumption of global risk-aversion implies that agents who turn down a gamble to lose 
$100  or win $200 with win-probability 0.5, would turn down a sequence of N such bets, 
say, N=100, as shown by Samuelson (1963).  Again, this appears absurd a priori. As a 
consequence of these implications, Rabin suggests that economists should reject standard 
expected-utility theory in favor of some version of the non-expected utility model, such 
as that proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. 
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iii The proportion of people reported as gambling is high and varies little between 
countries.  For instance, in 1998 68% of respondents in the United States reported 
gambling at least once in the previous year. Legal gambling losses in America totalled 
over $50 billion, and illegal gambling has been estimated at over $100 billion - greater 
than the estimated expenditure on illegal drugs [see e. g. Strumpf (2003), Pathological 
Gambling (1999), and The Wager (2000a)]. 
 
iv Strumpf (2003), in his study of six illegal bookmakers in New York City over the period 
1995-2000 (two of which had turnover in excess $100 million per annum), reports that 
average bet size was relatively large for these firms, averaging in excess of  $1000. We also 
note that observation of high rollers on odd/even bets at roulette is folklore. 
 
v Of course, it is still the case that some economists explain gambling by invoking non-
pecuniary returns such as excitement, buying a dream or entertainment [see e.g. Clotfelter 
and Cook (1989)].  However, there are convincing a priori and empirical reasons for 
giving little weight to this rationalization in general. Friedman and Savage (1948) provide 
one convincing a priori critique of the entertainment rationale.  Subsequently a number 
of surveys of gamblers have been conducted in which respondents are asked to cite the 
main reasons why they gamble. The predominant response, usually by 42%-70%, is for 
financial reasons - “to make money” [see e.g. Cornis (1978), and The Wager (2000 b)]. 
vi If we define the current level of wealth as W , and the level of utility associated with W
as U then the exponential utility function  
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U U U W x= + +( )  (a) 
defines utility for increases in wealth above W , where W x+ is wealth measured from 
W to  . We require that the marginal utility and the second derivative for an increase in 
wealth, 

>


U
x
U
x
0
2
2, < 0 .  For a decrease in wealth belowW , we define the utility 
function as 
U U U W x=  ( )  (b) 
where W - x is wealth measured from 0 to W . We require that the marginal utility and 
the second derivative for a decrease in wealth are both positive, as postulated by 
Kahneman and Tversky.  
xi This possibility receives some support from the empirical analysis of race-track betting 
by Jullien and Sallanie (2000). 
xii There is an observational equivalence between increasing (decreasing) s and 
decreasing (increasing)  in this model.  is a scale parameter. 
ix The postulated degree of loss aversion is based partly on experimental evidence in 
which students required a “substantial” win of approximately $30 in order to induce them 
to bet $10 on a 50/50 chance.    
 
x Note that in the exponential value function we can redefine s as the percentage of 
wealth (by deflating by total wealth and redefining the parameters).
xi In particular the agent prefers   gamble A to B, C to D,  E to F,  G to H,  I to J, K to L.  
where A is a certain  1 million,  B is   5 million with probability 0.1, 1 million with 
probability 0.89 and zero with probability 0.01.  C  is 5 million with probability 0.1, D is  
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1 million with probability 0.11,  E is 2,400  with certainty, F is 2500 with probability 
0.33, 2400 with probability 0.66 and zero with probability 0.01, G is 2500 with 
probability 0.33, H is 2400 with probability 0.34.,  I is 3000 with certainty, J is 3000 with 
probability 0.8, K is 4000, with probability 0.2, L is 3000 with probability 0.25.  
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